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Abstract
Performing searches over encrypted data is a very current and active area. Several efficient
solutions have been provided for the single-writer scenario in which all sensitive data originates with
one party (the Data Owner) that encrypts it and uploads it to a public repository. Subsequently
the Data Owner (or authorized clients, the Query Sources) accesses the encrypted data through
a Query Processor which has direct access to the public encrypted repository. Motivated by the
recent trend in pervasive data collection, we depart from this model and consider a multi-writer
scenario in which data originates with several and mutually untrusted parties. In this new scenario
the Data Owner provides public parameters so that each item of the generated data stream can
be put into an encrypted stream; moreover, the Data Owner keeps some related secret information
needed to generate tokens so that different subscribers can access different subsets of the encrypted
stream in clear, as specified by corresponding access policies.
We propose security model for this problem that we call Secure Selective Stream (SSS) and
give a secure construction for it based on hard problems in Pairing-Based Cryptography. The
cryptographic core of our construction is a new primitive, Amortized Encryption Scheme (AOE),
that is crucial for the efficiency of the resulting SSS.
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1 Introduction
As computing devices become more and more pervasive, our means to collect data become more and
more distributed and allow to have data on phenomena that occur in a widespread area. Reality
mining is defined as “the collection of machine-sensed environmental data pertaining to human social
behavior [16]” and has changed the way human interactions are studied. A similar phenomenon is
taking place in the health care domain in which epidemiological data can be collected at a countrywide
level by hospitals and private practices. The ability to create large data sets poses serious privacy
concerns and requires extra care. Encryption is the obvious tool to preserve data confidentiality and
recent advances in Cryptography allow the owner of the data to perform (or to enable third parties
to perform) specific queries on encrypted data. Even though searchable encryption [8] has been
introduced as a public key primitive, all systems in the literature providing query capabilities over
encrypted data (most notably CryptDB [35]) have considered a scenario in which the data originates
with one user and the same user (or some authorized third parties) performs searches on the encrypted
data. We are interested in the more challenging scenario in which several data sources generate data
managed by a data owner and the data owner enables several query sources to view parts of the data
according to its own access policies (which may vary depending on the query source). The query
sources use query processors that have direct access to the stream of encrypted data generated by the
data sources and select data to which access is granted. Thus, roughly speaking, we are interested in a
multi-writer, and thus public-key, setting whereas previous proposals have considered a single-writer,
and thus private-key, setting.
Secure Selective Streams. We formalize the scenario we just introduced by the notion of a Secure
Selective Stream (SSS) scheme. More precisely, we have four different types of actors: one Data
Owner, multiple Data Sources, multiple Query Sources, multiple Query Processors (see Figure 1).
The Data Owner (the DO, in short) manages access policies to the data originating from several Data
Sources (the DSs, in short) and collected in encrypted form on a possibly untrusted server. The
Query Processors (the QPs, in short) have direct physical access to the encrypted data and perform
the queries on behalf of the Query Sources (the QSs, in short). We consider a threat model in which
the Data Owner DO is the only fully trusted party. The Data Sources (the DSs) are trusted to upload
significant data but they should not be able to read the data uploaded by other DSs. The Query
Processors QPs are honest-but-curious and it is expected to execute the prescribed code. The Query
Sources (the QSs) should be able to learn only the data they have been authorized to read by the DO.
This requirement extends to coalitions of QSs: a coalition can only learn the union of the data they
are authorized to read and nothing else. Of course, with the help of the QPs, they could learn, for
example, which data items were selected by both queries they have been authorized to issue but, still,
no extra data item is revealed. We also protect the QSs from the QPs by not letting the QPs read the
result of the queries issued by the QSs and we want the QPs not to learn the exact number of selected
data items. In other words, the QPs and DS only learn data-access and search patterns and no explicit
data, except the authorized data, is disclosed. The mechanism by which the DO decides which query
is a QS authorized to issue is not considered in this paper. We stress also that, even though the
DSs can encrypt data, they do not have the ability to authorize searches. In other words the ability
to write (to encrypt) data is decoupled from the ability to query (to decrypt) data thus making our
scenario inherently a public-key one. We look at the case in which the data streams are collected
as data items with same number of cells. We aim to support access that correspond to conjunctive
queries composed by equality-based predicates. That is, each query asks to see the content of some of
the cells of the data items that satisfy the search predicates.
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Our approach. The recent advances in Functional Encryption [11] provide a straightforward secure
implementation of our scenario. More precisely, the DO publishes the public key of a Functional
Encryption scheme to be used by a DSs to encrypt the data items. The DO uses the associated secret
key to compute the token needed to perform the query the specific QS is authorized to perform. A
QP then simply applies the token to the encrypted data and returns the result. This approach has the
advantage of supporting any query that can be expressed by a small (polynomial) circuit [17, 38, 2]
(and, actually, even more [3]). Unfortunately, these are to be seen more as feasibility results and
unlikely to be, at this stage, of direct use in a practical system. We are less ambitious with respect to
the range of queries supported but we do insist on an efficient and practical solution with clear and
provable security guarantees. Specifically, we consider the case in which the DSs generate a stream of
rows with the same number of cells and we wish to support queries that select one specified cell from
all rows that satisfy an access policy that can be expressed as a conjunction of equalities between cells
and constants. Even for the set of access policies (or, equivalently, queries) of our interest, the state
of the art in public-key functional encryption does not offer an adequate solution.
Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE, see [12, 20, 15]) seems to perfectly suit our setting. Roughly
speaking, HVE allows to encrypt plaintext M with respect to attribute vector X = (X1, . . . , Xn) with
components taken from an attribute space X . The owner of the master secret key can generate tokens
associated with vectors Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) in which each component is either a “don’t care symbol” ?
or an element of X . A token associated with Y can be used to decrypt all ciphertexts whose attribute
vector X coincides with Y in all components that are not ?. HVE can be used to implement our
scenario in a straightforward way: the DS encrypts each cell of the table by using the values in the
other columns of the same row as attributes and the value in the cell itself as plaintext. Then, as it
easily seen, every query that we wish to support directly maps to a vector Y and thus a QS requests
the appropriate token to the DO. A QP applies the token to each encrypted cell and returns the ones
that are decrypted correctly. The simple implementation described above is not practical, though.
First of all, the secret key of all the known implementations of HVE need O(n · log |X |) group elements
each of size proportional to the security parameter. More importantly, the ciphertext of one cell has
length proportional to n · log |X | where n is the number of columns in a row. This implies that a row
with n columns, once encrypted, will have length Ω(n2), clearly impractical. This second problem
seems inherent since, obviously, a ciphertext must be at least as long as its attributes. Our main
technical contribution is based on the observation that cells of the same row are encrypted using the
same attributes and thus we could hope to have an amortized encryption scheme that can be used to
reduce the cumulative length of the ciphertexts of the cells of a row.
Amortized Orthogonality Encryption. In order to get around the efficiency drawback of HVE, we
introduce the notion of an Amortized Orthogonality Encryption scheme (an AOE scheme, in short) and
provide a construction for it. Before explaining how AOE can be used to reach our goal of an efficient
and secure SSS, we give a rough description of AOE. In a regular (i.e., non-amortized) Orthogonality
Encryption scheme, ciphertexts and tokens are associated with attribute vectors of the same length
over some finite field. A token associated with vector Y can be used to decrypt all ciphertexts whose
associated attribute vector X is orthogonal to Y . Orthogonality Encryption can be used to implement
HVE as well as disjunctive queries that will be useful in our scenario.1 An Amortized Orthoganility
Encryption scheme has the extra feature that the encryption algorithm takes as input n plaintexts
1Orthogonality Encryption has been introduced by [24] with the name of “Inner Product Encryption.” Recently, the
term “Inner Product” has been also used by [1] in connection with a different albeit related concept. We choose to use
the term “Orthogonality Encryption” as it better reflects the nature of the concept we intend to use and avoids any
misunderstanding as to which of the two concepts, the one of [24] or the one of [1], we are using.
4
M1, . . . ,Mn and n + 1 attribute vectors X0, X1, . . . , Xn, where X1, . . . , Xn have the same length k
and X0 a possibly different length l, and produces a cumulative ciphertext eRow in which plaintext
Mi is encrypted with respect to attribute vector (X0, Xi) of length l + k obtained by concatenating
X0 and Xi. The cumulative ciphertext has total length Θ(l + n · k), which is asymptotically optimal
as it is proportional to the total length of the attributes. The owner of the master secret key msk for
an AOE can release two types of tokens: predicate-only tokens, the P-tokens, and message tokens, the
M-tokens. A P-token is associated with a vector Y0 of length l and it can be used to check whether the
attribute vector X0 associated with a cumulative ciphertext eRow is orthogonal to Y0. Notice that no
plaintext is obtained by applying a P-token to a eRow. An M-token instead is associated with a vector
Y of length l + k and, when applied to a cumulative ciphertext, can be used to obtain message Mi
only if the corresponding attribute vector (X0, Xi) is orthogonal to Y .
Efficiency. As we have stated above, the cumulative ciphertext has total length Θ(l + n · k). When
implemented in a bilinear settings (like all the known implementations of HVE and Orthogonality or,
as it is called in the literature, IPE), the length of the ciphertext corresponds to the number of group
elements. In implementing our scenario for data organized in rows with n columns, we will use AOE
with k := 2 and l := 2n + 1 thus yielding, for each row, a cumulative ciphertext with Θ(n) group
elements as opposed to Θ(n2) group elements needed by Orthogonality. The saving is not only in
space but also in the time needed to perform encryption and decryption as they take time linear in
the number of group elements. Therefore, using AOE guarantees that encryption takes time linear in
the number of columns whereas Orthogonality would use quadratic time (see also Section 5).
Implementing SSS using AOE. We use AOE to provide a secure implementation of SSS according
to the following steps (refer to Figure 1): (i) The DO generates a pair of public and secret master
key (mpk, msk) and distributes the mpk to all DSs. (ii) A DS adds a new data item consisting of cells
M1, . . . ,Mn to the encrypted stream by performing the following steps. Each Mi is encrypted by using
the public master key mpk and a set of attributes that depends on the actual values contained in the
cells and on the index i of cell Mi. We point out that the resulting values of l and k will be such that
a cumulative ciphertext of a data item with n cells has length Θ(n) which is asymptotically optimal
(see the discussion in Section 5). (iii) An access policy Q is specified by the column d to be selected
Figure 1: The architecture of our scenario.
and by a sequence of pairs attribute and value (ij ,mj)
ν
j=1, for some ν ≤ n. The DO, upon receiving
the request for the token for Q from a QS, computes a P-token pTok and a M-token mTok. The P-token
checks if the attributes derived from the common attributes M1, . . . ,Mn of the cells of a data item
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satisfy the predicate
PPQ(M1, . . . ,Mn) :=
ν∧
j=1
(Mij = mj).
The M-token instead is such that it can be used to decrypt all cells in the d-th position of data items
that satisfy the predicate
PMQ(M1, . . . ,Mn, i) := (i = d) ∧
ν∧
j=1
(Mij = mj).
We postpone the discussion on how mTok and pTok can be computed by means of an AOE. DO passes
mTok and pTok to QS that keeps the mTok for himself and passes the pTok to a QP. (iv) The QP uses
pTok to select rows from the encrypted table to be passed to the QS. (v) The QS applies mTok to each
of the rows received from the QP. We remark that QP does not learn which cell the QS is interested
in nor its content.
We have implemented the construction in C/C++ showing the feasibility and efficiency of our
approach. We present our implementation in Section 5.
Orthogonality supports PP and PM. Let us now briefly explain how orthogonality can be used to
implement encryption that supports tokens for PP and PM. Inner product computation can be used
to encrypt data so that one can issue tokens to check polynomial identities. Specifically, observe that
evaluating a d-degree multivariate polynomial P (x1, . . . , xm) in a m-dimensional point (r1, . . . , rm)
corresponds to an inner product computation between the vector Y of the coefficients of the polynomial
P and the O(md) monomials rd11 · rd22 · · · · rdmm . In our case, the arithmetization of predicate PP gives a
polynomial of degree 2 with with O(n) non-zero coefficients (n is the number of cells in a row) whereas
for PM we obtain a polynomial of degree 1 and thus with O(n) non-zero coefficients. Therefore, we need
AOE with l = O(n) and k = O(1) and this keeps the size of the cumulative ciphertext corresponding to
a row with n cells O(n). As we shall see in Section 5 the constants hidden by the asymptotic notation
are very small and the resulting implementation is quite practical.
Related works. All the major commercial RDBMS releases provide functionalities to encrypt the data
they store (see, for example, [31]). However, these solutions are based on data-at-rest encryption, thus
limiting the functionalities over encrypted data, that have to be decrypted by the server before queries
can be processed. Therefore this type of solutions is not suited for our scenario. More limited support
for secure operations is provided by systems that manage data streams such as pub/sub systems.
The advent of fast networks and cheap online storage has made viable the management of encrypted
data at application-level. One of the first works to present the paradigm database-as-a-service is
[18]. In [4] a database architecture based on a trusted hardware cryptographic module is presented.
In [19], a prototype is presented that executes queries over an encrypted relational database in a
multiple client setting. Their approach offers protection to non-compromised clients against a passive
attacker that has access to all the data of a fraction of clients. Symmetric Searchable Encryption
(SSE) provides a way to perform keyword searches on encrypted data. Here the Data Owner pre-
processes and encrypts the data so to allow the Query Processor to perform queries efficiently. The
first construction giving sublinear time was presented in [14] and extended to conjunctive and general
Boolean searches by [13]. Both constructions are single-writer (only the DO can encrypt) and single-
reader (only the DO can perform searches). This was extended to single-writer and multi-reader (i.e.,
allowing multiple independent QSs) by [21]. Our system can be seen as the first proposal allowing
for multiple writers (DSs) and readers (QSs). Having a single trusted writer allows for a centralized
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and optimized pre-processing of the data which is not possible in our multi-writer scenario. On the
other hand, most of the proposals based on SSE are static in the sense that it is very expensive to add
new data (unless only single-keyword searches are supported [22] or extra information is leaked [13]).
In contrast, in our proposal any Data Source DS can efficiently add new data to the table at the
cost of an encryption and without the help of the DO. Different advanced cryptographic primitives
have been employed in the design and construction of systems supporting queries over encrypted
tables. CryptDB [35, 34] is the prime example of this line of research. CryptDB is in the single-
writer model and leaks statistical information on the whole queried column (that is, not limited to the
matching rows) and this can be exploited by attacks that can reveal significant information such as
repeated values in the column (see [28, 36]). These attacks leverage on CryptDB’s use of deterministic
and property-preserving encryption (PPE) that are instrumental to support advanced queries. Our
proposal does not use any of these cryptographic primitives and thus these attacks are irrelevant.
Moreover, AOE, unlike PPE, does not have any inherent leakage on the encrypted plaintext (besides
some trivial information such as plaintext length). The work of [23] provided a new construction that
does not make use of property-preserving encryption and that supports a large class of SQL queries.
More recently, Boelter et al. [6, 33] have presented a single-writer system for querying encrypted data,
called Arx, that supports range queries, in addition to our set of queries. The technical core of the
system is a construction of a secure scheme for performing range queries on a key-value table [6].
Mylar [39] is another recently proposed system that uses advanced encryption techniques to support
web applications that store encrypted data on a server, allows for keyword searches over it, and the
sharing of data encrypted using different keys. The system relies on multi-key searchable encryption
[41] that allows for the transformation of a keyword search token from one user to another. As shown
by Grubbs et al. [40], Mylar can be attacked by compromising the server allowing the attacker to
retrieve the plaintext keyword used for a search and discover which documents contain it. Also, the
key transformation technique is transitive, and this can create additional security problems. These
attacks are not relevant for our proposal as we rely on different cryptographic primitives. Regarding
systems managing data streams, such as publish-subscribe systems, overviews of the challenges faced
by cryptographic solutions are in [42] and [43]. There is a growing body of literature applying attribute-
based and proxy re-encryption based techniques in pub-sub architectures. See [45], [46] for significant
examples of pub-sub systems allowing that collect and distributed encrypted data streams.
In contrast to the works described above, our work is more cryptographic (and less system ori-
ented) in nature and proposes a new efficient cryptographic primitive with a direct application to a
concrete application scenario that has not been implemented by existing systems. A first version of
the AOEscheme is presented in [47], where it is deployed in order to provide secure queries over an
encrypted repository. In the public-key domain, we mention the first proposal of Searchable Encryp-
tion [8] supporting very simple queries then extended to conjunctive queries in [12]. Our construction
of AOE is inspired by the constructions of public-key encryption schemes supporting the orthogonal-
ity predicate, a concept introduced by [24] along with the first secure construction based on bilinear
groups of composite order. A construction based on bilinear groups of prime order is given in [32]
and it constitutes the starting block of our AOE. Constructions of the orthogonality encryption with
adaptive security were given in [25, 29]. The issue of short ciphertexts and keys for the orthogo-
nality encryption scheme was studied in [30] that gave a construction with short ciphertexts for the
orthogonality encryption but no security guarantee was offered for the attributes (in other words, [30]
gives an attribute-based orthogonality encryption scheme). Note that in our setting this is crucial as
the attribute of a cell are the values of the cells in the same row and therefore they must be kept
secret. The problem of query privacy has also been studied. For the specific case of orthogonality
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encryption, an elegant construction that guarantees security of the query has been given in [37]. In
general, indistinguishability-based query privacy is possible only in a private-key settings and thus
cannot be achieved in our multi-writer scenario; alternatively, one has to consider the case in which
the function is sampled from a sufficiently large space [10].
Roadmap. In Section 2, we give formal definition for the notion of a Secure Selective Stream. We
also give two security notions and prove equality of the notions for access policies of our interest.
In Section 3, we introduce the notion of an Amortized Orthogonality Encryption, and show how
to constuct a Secure Selective Stream using an Amortized Orthogonality Encryption as a black box.
In Section 4, we give a construction of an Amortized Orthogonality Encryption and prove its
security under hardness assumptions in Bilinear settings.
Finally, in Section 5 we describe our implementation and discuss the outcome of our experimental
evaluation.
2 Secure Selective Stream
In this section, we introduce the notion of a Secure Selective Stream (SSS) scheme and present two
security definitions for it. We will prove that for a large class of policies, including the one for which
we will provide a construction, the two security notions coincide.
2.1 Syntax
As described in Section 1, our scenario for SSS consists of four classes of parties: one Data Owner
(DO), several independent Query Processors (QP), several independent Data Sources (DS), and several
independent Query Sources (QS). Data is in the form of rows with the same number n of cells. The
Data Owner DO enables access to the data by providing tokens to the Query Sources QSs who issue
access requests consisting of pairs (Pol, k), where Pol is a policy taken from a fixed set of supported
policies P and 1 ≤ k ≤ n is an integer. Typically, a policy Pol is a predicate evaluated on rows. Access
request (Pol, k) asks for access to cell k of all rows Row such that Pol(Row) = True.
Definition 1 A Secure Selective Stream (SSS) scheme consists of 6 efficient algorithms (Init,AuthorizeSel,
AuthorizeDec,Encrypt, Select,Decrypt) that are used by the parties of our scenario in the following way.
• The DO, on input the security parameter λ and the length n of the rows, runs (mpk, msk) ←
Init(1λ, 1n) to obtain the master public key mpk and the master secret key msk. The master
public key mpk is given to all Data Sources, whereas the master secret key msk is kept secret by
the DO.
• A DSruns eRow ← Encrypt(mpk, Row) to produce an encrypted row eRow to be placed on the
encrypted stream that is accessed by the QPs.
• Upon receiving an access request (Pol, k) from a QS, the DO computes a pair consisting of predi-
cate token pTok← AuthorizeSel(msk, Pol) and message token mTok← AuthorizeDec(msk, Pol, k).
pTok can be used to select rows that satisfy the policy Pol, whereas mTok can be applied to decrypt
the k-th component of a row that satisfy Pol. The pair (pTok, mTok) is given to the QS that has
made request. We expect that DO checks that the specific QS has the right to request a token for
(Pol, k). We do not elaborate further on this point.
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• The QS gives the predicate token to a QP that will use it to select the rows that satisfy Pol
by running {0, 1} ← Select(eRow, pTok) on the encrypted rows that appear in the stream. The
selected rows are passed to the QS.
• The QS decrypts the k-th component of an encrypted row eRow by running Rowk ← Decrypt(eRow, mTok, k).
We remark that in our model a QS does not directly access the encrypted stream but rather it
delegates a QP to select the rows of interest for the QS to decrypt. The QP is not necessarily trusted
and thus will not have access to the stream of data in plain, not even to the cells of the selected rows
that the QS is authorized to read. We stress that our model and implementation are flexible enough
to allow a QS that has direct access to the encrypted stream to subsume the role of a QP.
We next give two security definitions for SSS: a simulation-based one and a game-based one. We
shall prove that, for a class of supported policies that we call invertible, the two notions are equivalent.
2.2 Simulation-based security
We start by defining the concept of an instance of SSS and of a view of an adversary with respect to
an instance.
Definition 2 An (n,m, l)-instance I = (Stream,AccReq) of an SSS with supported set P of policies
consists of two components:
• a stream Stream = ((Row1, idS1), . . . , (Rowm, idSm)) of m pairs each consisting of a row Rowi
with n cells and of the identifier idSi of the DS that has originated the row;
• a sequence of access requests AccReq = (AccReq1, . . . ,AccReql), where each
AccReqj = ((Polj , kj), idQj , idPj) consists of an access request (Polj , kj) with Polj ∈ P, of the
identifier, idQj, of the QS that has issued the j-th access request and of the identifier, idPj, of
the QP that handles the request on behalf of idQj.
Let C = CS ∪ CP ∪ CQ be a coalition consisting of a set CS of nS DSs, a set CP of nP QPs, and
a set CQ of nQ QSs. We next define View
C(λ, I), the view in the RealGame of a coalition C for an
(n,m, l)-instance I = (Stream,AccReq) and security parameter λ.
Definition 3 Let S be an SSS. The view with respect to S, ViewCS(λ, I), of a coalition C = CS∪CP∪CQ
for a (n,m, l)-instance I = (Stream,AccReq) and security parameter λ is produced by the following
RealGameCS(λ, I) experiment
1. Set (mpk, msk)← Init(1λ, 1n).
2. Write Stream as Stream = ((Row1, idS1), . . . , (Rowm, idSm)).
For each (Rowi, idSi) with i ∈ [m]
set eRowi ← Encrypt(mpk, Rowi);
if idSi ∈ CS then set vRowi = Rowi else set vRowi =⊥;
set eRow = (eRow1, . . . , eRowm) and set vRow = (vRow1, . . . , vRowm).
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3. Write AccReq as AccReq = (AccReq1, . . . ,AccReql).
For each j ∈ [l]
write AccReqj as AccReqj = ((Polj , kj), idQj , idPj);
set pTokj ← AuthorizeSel(msk, Polj);
set mTokj ← AuthorizeDec(msk, Polj , kj);
if idPj ∈ CP or idQj ∈ CQ then vpTokj = pTokj else vpTokj =⊥;
if idQj ∈ CQ then vmTokj = mTokj else vmTokj =⊥;
set vTokj = (vpTokj , vmTokj);
if idQj ∈ CQ then vPolj = (Polj , kj);
if idQj 6∈ CQ and idPj ∈ CP then vPolj = (Polj ,⊥);
if idQj 6∈ CQ and idPj 6∈ CP then vPolj = (⊥,⊥);
set vTok = (vTok1, . . . , vTokl);
set vPol = (vPol1, . . . , vPoll).
4. Output ViewCS(λ, I) = (mpk, eRow, vRow, vTok, vPol).
Leakage. We next define the minimal leakage mL(C, I) which is obtained by a coalition C = CS ∪
CP ∪ CQ about a (n,m, l)-instance I = (Stream,AccReq) in SSS. Roughly speaking, the minimal
leakage of an instance I consists of all data that is either originated by members of the coalition or
for which the coalition is authorized. It consists of the following components:
1. The parameters n,m and l that are, respectively, the number of cells per row, the total number
of rows composing the stream and the number of access requests;
2. Write Stream as Stream = ((Row1, idS1), . . . , (Rowm, idSm)).
For each (Rowi, idSi), with i ∈ [m], define lRowi as follows:
if idSi ∈ CS then lRowi = Rowi else lRowi =⊥.
Define lRow = (lRow1, . . . , lRowm).
3. For each access request AccReqj = ((Polj , kj), idQj , idPj), with j ∈ [l], define lPolj and lkj as
follows:
if idPj ∈ CP or idQj ∈ CQ then lPolj = Polj else lPolj =⊥;
if idQj ∈ CQ then lkj = kj else lkj =⊥.
4. For each access request AccReqj = ((Polj , kj), idQj , idPj), with j ∈ [l], and for each Rowi, with
i ∈ [m], define lSeli,j and lVali,j as follows:
if idQj ∈ CQ or idPj ∈ CP then lSeli,j = lPolj(Rowi) else lSeli,j =⊥;
if idQj ∈ CQ and Polj(Rowi) = True then lVali,j = Rowi,kj else lVali,j =⊥;
Define lSelj = (lSel1,j , . . . , lSelm,j) and lValj = (lVal1,j , . . . , lValm,j).
5. For each access request AccReqj , define lReqj = (lPolj , lkj , lSelj , lValj) and lReq = (lReq1, . . . ,
lReql).
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6. Set mL(C, I) = (lRow, lReq).
We are now ready for our simulation-based security definition.
Definition 4 An SSS is simulation-based secure with respect to leakage L if there exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) simulator Sim such that, for all coalitions C and n,m, l = poly(λ), the families
{ViewC(λ, I)} and {Sim(1λ,L(C, I))}
are indistinguishable.
Definition 5 An SSS is simulation-based secure if it is simulation-based secure with respect to min-
imal leakage mL.
2.3 Game-based security
Now, we give our second, game-based security definition. We model security of SSS by means of
two games, SSDGame0 and SSDGame1, between a challenger Ch and a probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary A. The game SSDGameηA(λ) for η = 0, 1, security parameter λ and adversary A starts with
A outputting two challenge streams Stream0 and Stream1 and a coalition C of corrupted players. Ch
receives the challenge streams, computes (mpk, msk) ← Init(1λ, 1n) and sends the master public key
mpk to A. Moreover, Ch returns eStream = Encrypt(mpk,Streamη) to A. The query phase then starts
and A can issue AccReqj = ((Polj , kj), idQj , idPj), for j = 1, . . . , l = poly(λ), of its choice in order
to receive predicate and message tokens pTok and mTok from the challenger Ch according to whether
idQj , idPj ∈ C. After A has finished issuing its queries, it outputs bit b and we denote by pηA(λ) the
probability that A outputs q.
We let I0 = (Stream0,AccReq) and I1 = (Stream1,AccReq), where AccReq = (AccReq1, . . . ,AccReql).
We say that A is an admissible adversary if mL(C, I0) = mL(C, I1).
Definition 6 An SSS S is game-based secure if, for all admissible PPT adversaries A∣∣p0A(λ)− p1A(λ)∣∣ ≤ negl(λ).
2.4 Invertible policies
In this section, we define a class of policies, that we call invertible, and we show that, for SSS supporting
an invertible set of policies, the two notions of security of Definition 5 and Definition 6 are equivalent.
We start by defining the concept of a constraint and of a compatible set of constraints. We identify
three types of constraints for a set P of supported policies over rows of length n.
• Full Positive Constraint: ctr = (Pol, k, val) consisting of policy Pol ∈ P, integer 1 ≤ k ≤ n and
value val. A row Row = 〈Row1, . . . , Rown〉 is admissible with respect to ctr if Pol(Row) = True
and Rowk = val.
• Positive Constraint: ctr = (Pol,⊥,⊥) consisting of policy Pol ∈ P. A row Row is admissible
with respect to ctr if Pol(Row) = True.
• Negative constraint: ctr = (Pol,⊥,⊥) consisting of a policy Pol ∈ P. A row Row is admissible
with respect to ctr if Pol(Row) = False.
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Definition 7 A constraint set V = (ctrf, ctr+, ctr−) consisting of a set ctrf of full positive con-
straints, a set ctr+ of positive constraints and a set ctr− of negative constraints is compatible if there
exists at least one row Row that is admissible with respect to all constraints of V.
We can now give the following definition of invertible policies.
Definition 8 A set of policies P is invertible if there exists a polynomial-time algorithm ConstAdm
such that, for all compatible sets of constraints V = (V f,V+,V−), outputs a row Row admissible for V.
The following two sections will prove equivalence of the game-based security notion and the
simulation-based security notion for Secure Selective Stream supporting invertible policies.
Theorem 1 Let S be an SSS supporting an invertible set of policies. Then S is game-based secure if
and only if S is simulation-based secure.
2.5 Simulation-based security implies game-based security for invertible policies
In this section, we show that if S is simulation-based secure SSS then it is also game-based secure.
Let A be an admissible adversary for the security game SSDGame and let C be coalition output by A
and Ib = (Streamb,AccReq), for b = 0, 1 be the instances defined by A. Note that the two instances
have the same minimal leakage (that is, mL(I0) = mL(I1)).
Now consider an hybrid game in in which the encrypted stream eStream is produced by running the
simulator on input the minimum leakage associated with the coalition C (instead of setting eStream
equal to an encryption of Stream0 or Stream1). Note that this is possible because the adversary of the
security game is admissible and thus the two instances have the same minimal leakage with respect to
C. By the simulation-based security, the view of A in the hybrid game is indistinguishable from the
view of the A in SSDGame for both b = 0 and b = 1. Therefore the probabilities p0A(λ) and p1A(λ) that
A outputs 1 in games SSDGame0A(λ) and SSDGame1A(λ), respectively, differ by a negligible factor.
2.6 Game-based security implies simulation-based security for invertible policies
For the reverse implication, we construct a simulator Sim that, for any SSS with invertible set of
supported policies P, has access to the procedure ConstAdm that takes as input a set ctr+ of satisfied
access requests and a set ctr− of unsatisfied access requests and returns a row that satisfies all
constraints.
The simulator Sim takes as input the security parameter 1λ, a coalition C = CS∪CP ∪CQ consisting
of DSs,QPs and QSs and the minimal leakage mL(C, I) for a (n,m, l)-instance I. In addition Sim has
black-box access to the algorithms of a SSS implementation. Roughly speaking, the main difficulty for
Sim lies in producing the ciphertexts of the rows that appear in the stream. The rows that are produced
by a corrupted DS are given in clear as part of the leakage and thus they can be just encrypted by Sim.
For each row Rowi that is produced by a honest DS, Sim uses the leakage received as input to construct
a set of constraints Vi = (ctrfi, ctr+i , ctr−i ) that Rowi must respect. Then, instead of encrypting the
actual Rowi appearing in the instance I, Sim encrypts a row that is computed by algorithm ConstAdm,
whose existence is guaranteed by the hypothesis that the SSS implementation supports an invertible
set of policies. Note that in this way, the simulator constructs an instance I ′ that has the same
leakage as the original instance I. Indistinguishability of the output of Sim from the actual view of
the coalition C then follows from the assumed game-based security of the implementation.
Let us now formally describe Sim(1λ,C,mL(C, I)).
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1. Write mL(C, I) as mL(C, I) = (lRow, lReq)
2. Set (mpk, msk)← Init(1λ, 1n).
3. Write lRow as lRow = (lRow1, . . . , lRowm).
4. For i ∈ [m] s.t. lRowi 6=⊥, set Rowi = lRowi.
5. For i ∈ [m] s.t. lRowi =⊥
Set ctrfi = ctr
+
i = ctr
−
i = ∅;
For j ∈ [l]
Write lReqj as lReqj = (lPolj , lkj , lSelj , lValj);
If lSeli,j = False then ctr
−
i = ctr
−
i ∪ {(lPolj ,⊥,⊥)}’
If lSeli,j = True and lki,j =⊥ then ctr+i = ctr+i ∪ {(lPolj ,⊥,⊥)};
If lSeli,j = True and lki,j 6=⊥ then ctrfi = ctrfi ∪ {(lPolj , lki,j , lVali,j)};
Set Rowi ← ConstAdm(ctrfi, ctr+i , ctr−i );
6. For i ∈ [m] set eRowi ← Encrypt(mpk, Rowi);
7. Set eRow = (eRow1, . . . , eRowm) and vRow = lRow.
8. For j ∈ [l]
Write lReqj as lReqj = (lPolj , lkj , lSelj , lValj);
if lPolj 6=⊥ then vpTokj ← AuthorizeSel(msk, lPolj) else vpTokj =⊥;
if lPolj 6=⊥ and lkj 6=⊥ then vmTokj ← AuthorizeDec(msk, lPolj , lkj) else vmTokj =⊥;
set vTokj = (vpTokj , vmTokj);
if lPolj 6=⊥ and lkj =⊥ then vPolj = (lPolj ,⊥);
if lPolj 6=⊥ and lkj 6=⊥ then vPolj = (lPolj , lkj);
if lPolj =⊥ and lkj =⊥ then vPolj = (⊥,⊥);
set vTok = (vTok1, . . . , vTokl);
set vPol = (vPol1, . . . , vPoll).
9. Return (mpk, eRow, vRow, vTok, vPol).
Security proof. For the sake of contradiction, we assume the existences of an adversary A that
distinguishes between {ViewCRealGame(λ, I)} and {Sim(1λ,L(C, I))}. We then construct a probabilistic
polynomial time adversary B that breaks game SSDGame thus reaching a contradiction.
We consider a series of hybrid games H0(λ, I), . . . ,Hn(λ, I) that are obtained from SSDGame
executed on instances derived from I. Specifically, for an instance I = (Stream,AccReq) and for
i = 0, . . . , n, in game Hi(λ, I) the first i rows of the stream are constructed by using ConstAdm on the
constraint sets derived from AccReq and the remaining rows are the same as the ones in Stream. Note
that H0(λ, I) coincides with ViewCRealGame(λ, I) and Hn(λ, I) instead coincides with Sim(1λ,mL(C, I)).
Therefore, if A has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing H0 and Hn, there must exist i such
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that A has non-negligible advantage in distinguishing Hi and Hi+1. That is, by denoting with piA(λ, I)
and pi+1A (λ, I) the probabilities that A outputs 1 when the input is distributed according to Hi(λ, I)
and to Hi+1(λ, I), we have ∣∣piA(λ, I)− pi+1A (λ, I)∣∣ ≥ 1/poly(λ), (1)
for some polynomial poly.
Algorithm B interacts with the challenger Ch of SSDGame and prepares two streams: Stream0 is
like in Hi, that is the first i rows are constructed by using ConstAdm and the remaining ones are from
Stream as appearing in instance I; Stream1 is like in Hi+1, that is the first i rows are constructed by
using ConstAdm and the remaining ones are from Stream as appearing in instance I. Then B requests
from Ch the tokens as specified in AccReq and constructs the view consisting of all the messages
received from Ch and passes it to A receiving a bit b. Then B outputs b and stops.
We note that B is an admissible adversary since the leakages for I0 = (Stream0,AccReq) and
I1 = (Stream1,AccReq) coincide. Moreover, if B in engaged in SSDGame0 with Ch, then the view
constructed is exactly the same as in Hi whereas, when engaged in SSDGame
1, it coincides with
Hi+1. Therefore, by denoting with p
0
B(λ) and p
1
B(λ) the probabilities that B outputs 1 in SSDGame0
and SSDGame1, respectively, we have that p0B(λ) = p
i
A(λ, I) and p1B(λ) = pi+1A (λ, I). Therefore by
Equation 1 we conclude that B is a successful adversary, thus reaching contradiction.
3 Constructing SSS from AOE
In this section we describe a construction of a SSS scheme where cells are elements in Zp and the
set of supported policies CONJ contains policies expressed as conjunctions of equality predicates.
Specifically, a policy (Pol, k) ∈ CONJ, consists of Pol = (Pol1, . . . , Poln) ∈ (Zp ∪ {?})n, and, for a
row Row = (Row1, . . . , Rown), we have Pol(Row) = True iff, for all i = 1, . . . , n, we have that
(Poli = ?) ∨ (Poli = Rowi)
where ? is a “don’t care” symbol.
Our construction uses as a black-box an Amortized Orthogonality Encryption (AOE) scheme and
prove that the SSS constructed satisfies the game-based security notion if the AOE employed is also
game-based secure.
In Section 4 we give a construction of AOE that can be proved secure under hardness assumptions
in the Bilinear setting. In Section 3.5, we prove that the set CONJ of policies is invertible and thus we
can conclude that our construction of SSS is also simulation-based secure, under hardness assumptions
in the Bilinear setting.
We start by introducing the concept of an Amortized Orthogonality Encryption and its security
notions.
3.1 Amortized Orthogonality Encryption
An AOE scheme is a generalisation of the orthogonality encryption schemes in which ciphertexts and
keys are associated to attribute vectors of some fixed length over a finite field. A key associated with
vector S can decrypt a ciphertext associated with vector X, iff S and X are orthogonal. We denote
by 〈X,S〉 the inner product of X and S that checks orthogonality of the two vectors. Also, for vector
X0 of length n0 and vector X1 of length n1, we denote by (X0, X1) the vector of length n0 + n1
obtained by concatenating X0 and X1. In an Amortized Orthogonality Encryption scheme (AOE) the
14
encryption algorithm takes as input n plaintexts M1, . . . ,Mn each associated with a vector of length
u+ v and the n attribute vectors share the first u components. The goal is to amortize the length of
the ciphertexts so that it is proportional to u + n · v instead of proportional to n · (u + v). We will
use an AOE with constant v and u = Θ(n) which will make the total size of the n ciphertext Θ(n), a
considerable saving over Θ(n2). Let us start by defining the syntax of an AOE scheme.
Definition 9 An AOE scheme with message space M and attribute space X is a sequence of 6 prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithms (ParGen,Enc, pKeyGen, mKeyGen, pDec,mDec) with the following
syntax:
1. the parameter generator algorithm ParGen(1λ, 1n, 1u, 1v) takes as input security parameter λ,
multiplicity factor n, and length parameters u and v and outputs the master public key mpk and
the master secret key msk;
2. the encryption algorithm Enc(mpk,X ,M) takes as input master public key mpk, a sequence of
vectors of attributes X ∈ Xu×(Xv)n and a sequence of messagesM∈Mn and outputs cumulative
ciphertext ct = (ct0, ct1, . . . , ctn).
3. the P-token generator algorithm pKeyGen takes as input the master secret key msk, and the vector
of attributes S0 ∈ Xu and outputs P-token pTok;
4. the M-token generator algorithm mKeyGen takes as input the master secret key msk, the vectors
of attributes S0 ∈ Xu and Sk ∈ Xv and integer k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and outputs M-token mTok;
5. the P-decryption algorithm pDec takes as input the first component ct0 of a cumulative ciphertext
ct and a P-token pTok and outputs 0 or 1;
6. the M-decryption algorithm mDec takes as input a pair (ct0, ctk) of components of a cumulative
ciphertext and an M-token mTok and outputs either a message M ∈M or ⊥.
We have the following two correctness requirements.
Algorithm pDec: For every attribute vector S0 ∈ Xu and for every sequence X = (X0, X1, . . . , Xn) of
attribute vectors such that 〈S0, X0〉 = 0 and for every sequenceM = (M1, . . . ,Mn) of messages we have
that if (mpk, msk)← ParGen(1λ, 1n, 1u, 1v), and ct← Enc(mpk,X ,M), and pTok← pKeyGen(msk, S0),
then pDec(ct0, pTok) = 1, except with probability negligible in λ.
Algorithm mDec: For every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for every attribute vectors S0 ∈ Xu and Sk ∈ Xv, for
every sequence X = (X0, X1, . . . , Xn) of attribute vectors and for every sequence M = (M1, . . . ,Mn)
of messages we have that if (mpk, msk) ← ParGen(1λ, 1n, 1u, 1v), ct ← Enc(mpk,X ,M), and mTok ←
mKeyGen(msk, (S0, Sk, k)) then, if 〈(S0, Sk), (X0, Xk)〉 = 0 then mDec((ct0, ctk), mTok) = Mk, except
with probability negligible in λ.
3.2 Security game for AOE
We model privacy of the attributes and of the plaintexts in a cumulative ciphertext of an AOE by
means of game, AOEGame, between a challenger Ch and a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A.
The game AOEGameA(λ, n, u, v) takes as input the security parameter λ, the multiplicity factor n and
the length parameters u and v.
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1. The game starts with A outputting two challenge sequences of attributes X 0 = (X00 , . . . , X0n) and
X 1 = (X10 , . . . , X1n), whereX00 andX10 are attribute vectors of length u andX01 . . . , X0n, X11 . . . , X1n
have length v.
2. Ch generates a pair (mpk, msk) by running ParGen on input (1λ, 1n, 1u, 1v), sends mpk to A and
starts answering A queries.
3. A can issue two types of queries that are answered by Ch by using msk: M-token queries in which
A asks to see the token corresponding to (S0, Sk, k) of his choice; and P-token queries in which
A asks to see the token corresponding to attribute vector S0 of his choice.
4. At any time, A may send two sequences of n messages, M0 and M1, to Ch that replies by
flipping a random bit ξ and computing the challenge cumulative ciphertext ct? corresponding
to plaintexts Mξ encrypted with attributes X ξ.
5. At the end A outputs its guess ξ′ for ξ.
We say that A wins the game if ξ = ξ′ and
1. for all (S0, Sk, k) for which an M-token query has been issued byA, we have that 〈(S0, Sk), (X00 , X0k)〉 6=
0 and 〈(S0, Sk), (X10 , X1k)〉 6= 0;
2. for all vectors S0 for which a P-token query has been issued by A, we have that 〈S0, X00 〉 =
〈S0, X10 〉.
We denote by pA(λ, n, u, v) the probability that A wins the game and give the following definition
Definition 10 An AOE scheme is secure if, for all adversaries A and values n, u, v = poly(λ),∣∣∣∣pA(λ, n, u, v)− 12
∣∣∣∣
is a negligible function of λ.
We remark that the notion of security above corresponds to selective attribute hiding and adaptive
payload hiding.
3.3 Constructing SSS
Now, we construct our
SSS = (SSS.Init,SSS.AuthorizeSel, SSS.AuthorizeDec, SSS.Encrypt,SSS.Select,SSS.Decrypt)
based on AOE with messages from GT and attributes from Zp, and on a symmetric key encryption
scheme SYM = (enc, dec) that takes secret keys and messages from Zp, for some prime p.
1. SSS.Init(1λ, 1n) algorithm. With λ and n in input, the algorithm sets u = n+ 1 and v = 2 and
returns (mpk, msk)← AOE.ParGen(1λ, 1n, 1u, 1v).
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2. SSS.AuthorizeSel(msk, Pol) algorithm. The algorithm for generating a selection token takes as
input the master secret key msk and a policy Pol = (Pol1, . . . , Poln), where, for i = 1, . . . , n,
Poli ∈ Zp ∪ {?}. The algorithm, for i = 1, . . . , n, sets ti = 0 if Poli = ?, and otherwise it sets ti
to a random value of Zp. The algorithm then constructs the vector of length u = n+ 1
S0 = (−t1, . . . ,−tn,
n∑
i=1
tiPoli)
and computes and returns pTok← AOE.pKeyGen(msk, S0).
3. SSS.AuthorizeDec(msk, Pol, k) algorithm. The algorithm for generating a decryption token takes
as input the master secret key msk, a policy Pol = (Pol1, . . . , Poln) and integer k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
A vector S0 of length u is created as for algorithm AuthorizeSel, together with an additional
vector Sk = (k,−1) of length v. The algorithm returns mTok← AOE.mKeyGen(msk, S0, Sk, k).
4. SSS.Encrypt(mpk, Row) algorithm. The algorithm takes as input the master public key mpk and a
Row with n cells Row1, . . . , Rown. The algorithm randomly selectsM = Mi ∈ GT , for i = 1, . . . , n,
and it generates ski = H(Mi). Values sk1, . . . , skn are keys used to encrypt every cell as
ci ← SYM.enc(ski, Rowi). Then, it sets
X0 = (Row1, . . . , Rown, 1)
and
Xi = (1, i), for i = 1, . . . , n.
Vector X0 has length u, whereas the others have length v, and all of the vectors compose the
sequence of vectors X ∈ Zup × (Zvp)n, used as input of algorithm AOE.Enc(mpk,X ,M). The
result ct = (ct0, ct1, . . . , ctn) is used together with c = (c1, . . . , cn) to produce the output
eRow = (ct, c).
5. SSS.Select(eRow, pTok) algorithm. It takes as input the ciphertexts eRow = (ct, c), where ct =
(ct0, ct1, . . . , ctn), and a selection token pTok. It gives as a result the output of AOE.pDec(ct0, pTok).
6. SSS.Decrypt(eRow, mTok, k) algorithm. It takes in input the ciphertexts eRow composed of ct =
(ct0, . . . , ctn) and c = (c1, . . . , cn), a decryption token mTok and the integer k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The algorithm firstly computes the value Mk ← AOE.mDec(ct0, ctk, mTok). It then retrieves the
decryption key skk for the symmetric key encryption scheme by making use of the hash function
H(Mk). Finally, the message is decrypted and given as output Rowk ← SYM.dec(skk, ck).
3.4 Security of the SSS construction
The proposed construction makes black-box use of the two cryptographic primitives Amortized Or-
thogonality Encryption AOE and Symmetric Key Encryption SYM. We next show that if AOE is
game-based secure and SYM is IND-CPA secure then the construction of SSS is game-based secure.
We proceed by contradiction and assume the existence of an admissible adversary A that wins the
security game of SSS (see Section 2.3) and describe an adversary B that wins the security game of
AOE. Our description gives details on how the process is initialized, how B constructs the challenge
ciphertext and it answers A’s queries for tokens.
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We here make use of an AOE with attribute and message spaces Zp, and of a SYM with key and
message spaces Zp.
Init. B receives two streams, Stream0 and Stream1, of length m, and coalition C of corrupted play-
ers from A. We assume that Stream0 and Stream1 differ in exactly one position. This is with-
out loss of generality since, if this is not the case, we can consider m + 1 intermediate streams
Stream0, Stream1, . . . ,Streamm where Streami has the first i components equal to the first i compo-
nents of Stream1 and the remaining m − i equal to the last m − i components of Stream0. Clearly,
Stream0 = Stream
0 and Streamm = Stream
1 and, if B has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing
Stream0 and Streamm, there must exist i such that B has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing
Streami and Streami+1. Then observe that Streami and Streami+1 differ in exactly one component.
We also observe that neither of the two DSs associated to the two components of the two streams
is corrupted, otherwise the leakage associated with the two streams would not be equal, thus contra-
dicting the fact that A is an admissible adversary. Since neither is corrupted we can assume that they
are the same DS.
Finally, without loss of generality, we can assume that the two streams differ in the first component.
Thus we can summarize and write the two streams as
Stream0 = ((Row01, idS1), (Row
0
2, idS2), . . . , (Row
0
m, idSm))
and
Stream1 = ((Row11, idS1), (Row
1
2, idS2), . . . , (Row
1
m, idSm)).
Computing the challenge. B sets u = n + 1 and v = 2 and starts game AOEGame(λ, n, u, v) with Ch.
B starts by computing the two challenge sequences of attributes X 0 and X 1 as done by algorithm
Encrypt on input Row01 and Row
1
1, respectively. Specifically, B sets
X00 = (Row
0
1,1, . . . , Row
0
1,n, 1)
and
X10 = (Row
1
1,1, . . . , Row
1
1,n, 1)
and X0i = X
1
i = (1, i) for i = 1, . . . , n.
Moreover, B randomly selects messages M1, . . . ,Mn ∈ Zp and sets M0 =M1 = (M1, . . . ,Mn).
Then B sends attribute sequences X 0 = (X00 , X01 , . . . , X0n) and X 1 = (X10 , X11 , . . . , X1n) and message
sequences M0 and M1 to Ch receiving cumulative ciphertext ct1 and master public key mpk.
Then, for i = 1, . . . , n, B computes c1,i as c1,i = SYM.enc(Mi, 0). The pair (ct1, c1) where
c1 = (c1,1, . . . , c1,n) constitutes the simulated encryption of the first element of the stream. B then
computes the encryption of all the remaining rows by executing the encryption algorithm Encrypt
using public key mpk.
All the ciphertexts obtained (ct1, c1), · · · , (ctm, cm) are then sent to A.
Answering queries. Whenever A issues an access request AccReq = ((Pol, k), idQ, idP), B proceeds as
follows.
If idQ ∈ C then B issues an mKeyGen request to Ch for (Pol, k) constructing a vector of attributes
of length u+ v = n+ 3 as done by algorithm AuthorizeDec. The mTok obtained from Ch is then passed
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to A. If idQ ∈ C or idP ∈ C then B issues a pKeyGen request to Ch for Pol constructing a vector of
attributes of length u = n+ 1 as done by algorithm AuthorizeSel. The pTok obtained from Ch is then
passed to A.
The following remarks are in order. First of all, we observe that B is an admissible adversary for
AOE as all tokens it requests to Ch give the same result independently from whether Ch has encrypted
using the X 0 or X 1. Indeed B asks only for tokens that are seen by corrupted players and, by the
admissibility of A, they provide the same results when applied to the two challenges. Also, observe
that the view of A as constructed by B is not the same as in the security game for SSS. Indeed the
symmetric ciphertexts corresponding to the row of the first component of the stream are encryptions
of 0 (and not of the elements of Row01 or Row
1
1 as in the real view). However, we observe that the two
views are indistinguishable by the IND-CPA security of SYM. Further details are omitted.
We thus have the following theorem.
Theorem 2 If AOE is game-based secure and SYM is IND-CPA secure then SSS is game-based secure.
3.5 CONJ is invertible
In this section we show that the set of policies CONJ is invertible by providing an implementation of
the algorithm ConstAdm. This, together with Theorem 2 above and Theorem 1, gives the following
theorem.
Theorem 3 If AOE is game-based secure and SYM is IND-CPA secure then SSS is simulation-based
secure.
Algorithm ConstAdm takes as input a set of full positive constraints ctrf = (ctrf1, . . . , ctr
f
flen),
a set of positive constraints ctr+ = (ctr+1 , . . . , ctr
+
plen), and a set of negative constraints ctr
− =
(ctr−1 , . . . , ctr
−
nlen). Every policy Pol ∈ (ctr+∪ctr−) is composed of n elements Pol1, . . . , Poln ∈ Zp,
where each element is a string for the equality comparison or a don’t care symbol ?. The goal of the
algorithm is to build a row Row = (Row1, . . . , Rown) that is admissible with respect to all constraints
of ctrf ∪ ctr+ ∪ ctr−.
Firstly, ConstAdm instantiates an empty row Row = (Row1, . . . , Rown) and, for all pairs k, val ∈ ctrf,
sets Rowk = val. Then, it solves a system of plen linear equations where each equation is of the form
Pol1Row1 + . . .+ PolnRown −
n∑
i=1
Poli = 0,
with Pol ∈ ctr+. We note that the system has at a least one solution, because we know that exists a
row complying with those constraints. Now, if n <= plen, the algorithm returns Row. Otherwise, we
have d = n−plen cells in the system that can be freely set and are only dependent on the other cells.
The procedure picks these cells at random in {1, 2λ}. Then, it checks if all the following inequalities
Pol1Row1 + . . .+ PolnRown −
n∑
i=1
Poli 6= 0,
where Pol ∈ ctr−, are satisfied. If not, it picks the random values again, until the inequalities are
satisfied. We note that only with negligible d/2λ probability the inequalities are not satisfied and the
algorithm needs to pick random values again. Finally, the procedure ConstAdm returns Row.
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4 Constructing AOE
In this section we describe an AOE scheme with attribute from Zp, for some large p, and messages
from GT and prove that, under hardness assumptions in bilinear setting, the construction satisfies the
security property of Definition 10.
We start by formally describing the 6 algorithms defining an AOE.
1. ParGen(1λ, 1n, 1u, 1v) algorithm. The algorithm starts by randomly selecting a bilinear mapping
(G,GT , p, e) with security parameter λ. Then it randomly selects ω, α1, α2, β1, β2 ∈ Zp and con-
structs n+1 pairs of basic master secret keys ((bmsk10, bmsk
2
0), . . . , (bmsk
1
n, bmsk
2
n)). The two basic
master secret keys in the first pair consist of u+1 quadruples bmskb0 = (γi,b,0, δi,b,0, θi,b,0, ωi,b,0)
u+1
i=1 ,
for b = 1, 2 and, the reamining n pairs, for j = 1, . . . , n and b = 1, 2 bmskbj = (γi,b,j , δi,b,j , θi,b,j , ωi,b,j)
v+1
i=1
have length v+1. All components are randomly selected in Zp subject to α1 ·θi,1,j−β1 ·ωi,1,j = ω
and α2 · θi,2,j − β2 · ωi,2,j = ω. The master secret key msk is then set equal to
msk =
(
(α1, β1), (α2, β2), (ω, g, g2), (bmsk
1
j , bmsk
2
j )
n
j=0
)
,
where g, g2 are randomly selected in G and Λ = e(g, g2). The basic master public keys bmpk10
and bmpk20 are
bmpk10 = (Γi,1,0 = g
γi,1,0 ,∆i,1,0 = g
δi,1,0 ,Θi,1,0 = g
θi,1,0 ,
Wi,1,0 = g
ωi,1,0)u+1i=1
bmpk20 = (Γi,2,0 = g
γi,2,0 ,∆i,2,0 = g
δi,2,0 ,Θi,2,0 = g
θi,2,0 ,
Wi,2,0 = g
ωi,2,0)u+1i=1
and, for j = 1, . . . , n,
bmpk1j = (Γi,1,j = g
γi,1,j ,∆i,1,j = g
δi,1,j ,Θi,1,j = g
θi,1,j ,
Wi,1,j = g
ωi,1,j )v+1i=1
bmpk2j = (Γi,2,j = g
γi,2,j ,∆i,2,j = g
δi,2,j ,Θi,2,j = g
θi,2,j ,
Wi,2,j = g
ωi,2,j )v+1i=1 .
The master public key mpk is then computed by setting Ω = gω and then seting
mpk =
(
Λ,Ω,
(
bmpk1j , bmpk
2
j
)n
j=0
)
.
2. Enc(mpk,X ,M) algorithm. The encryption algorithm takes as input the master public key mpk,
a sequence of vectors of attributes X = (X0, . . . , Xn) and a sequence M = (M1, . . . ,Mn) of
messages. Vector X0 has length u, whereas the others have length v. The encryption algorithm
produces one cumulative ciphertext ct consisting of n + 1 basic ciphertexts ct0, . . . , ctn. The
encryption algorithm starts by selecting random y, z1, z2 ∈ Zp. The value s is used to extend
the vectors of attributes; specifically, the algorithm considers the vectors (X0, y) and (y,Xj) for
j > 0. We denote by xi,0 the i-th component of (X0, y) and, similarly, by xi,j the i-th component
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of (y,Xj). The algorithm also extends the sequence of messages by setting M0 = 1GT . Basic
ciphertext ctj , for j = 0, . . . , n, is computed by first randomly selecting lj , qj ∈ Zp and setting
Aj = g
qj Bj = Ω
lj Cj = Λ
qj ·Mj
and then by setting
Di,1,j = W
lj
i,1,j · Γqji,1,j · gz1·α1·xi,j
Ei,1,j = Θ
lj
i,1,j ·∆qji,1,j · gz1·β1·xi,j
Di,2,j = W
lj
i,2,j · Γqji,2,j · gz2·α2·xi,j
Ei,2,j = Θ
lj
i,2,j ·∆qji,2,j · gz2·β2·xi,j
where i goes from 1 to u+ 1, for j = 0; and to v + 1 for j > 0.
3. mKeyGen(msk, S0, Sk, k) algorithm. The algorithm for generating a message token takes as input
the master secret key msk, a vector of attributes S0 of length u, a vector of attributes Sk of
length v, and integer k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The algorithm uses the basic master keys for j = 0 and
j = k to generate the message token for (S0, Sk, k). Instead of considering them separately,
it is useful to see bmsk10 and bmsk
1
k as one basic master key of length f := (u + 1) + (v + 1)
obtained by concatenation and denote its i-th component (γi,1, δi,1, θi,1, ωi,1). Similarly, bmsk
2
0
and bmsk2k yield a basic master secret key of length f whose i-th component is the quadruple
(γi,2, δi,2, θi,2, ωi,2). The algorithm constructs vector of attributes S = (S0, 1,−1, Sk) of length f
and we denote by si its i-th component. The algorithm starts by selecting random λ1, λ2 ∈ Zp.
Then, for i = 1, . . . , f , the algorithm randomly selects ri,1, ri,2 ∈ Zp and sets
Ki,1 = g
β1·ri,1 · gλ1·θi,1·si Li,1 = gα1·ri,1 · gλ1·ωi,1·si
Ki,2 = g
β2·ri,2 · gλ2·θi,2·si Li,2 = gα2·ri,2 · gλ2·ωi,2·si
The algorithm returns message token mTok = (F,H, (Ki,1, Li,1,Ki,2, Li,2)
f
i=1), where
F = g2 ·
f∏
i=1
K
−γi,1
i,1 · L−δi,1i,1 ·K−γi,2i,2 · L−δi,2i,2
and
H = g
∑f
i=1 ri,1+ri,2 .
4. pKeyGen(msk, S) algorithm. The algorithm for generating a predicate token takes as input the
master secret key msk and a vector of attributes S of length u. Vector S is extended to length u+1
by appending 0. The algorithm starts by selecting random λ1, λ2 ∈ Zp. Then, for i = 1, . . . , u+1,
the algorithm randomly selects ri,1, ri,2 ∈ Zp and sets
Ki,1 = g
β1·ri,1 · gλ1·θi,0,1·si Li,1 = gα1·ri,1 · gλ1·ωi,0,1·si
Ki,2 = g
β2·ri,2 · gλ2·θi,0,2·si Li,2 = gα2·ri,2 · gλ2·ωi,0,2·si
The algorithm returns predicate token
pTok = (F,H, (Ki,1, Li,1,Ki,2, Li,2)
u+1
i=1 ), where
F = g2 ·
u+1∏
i=1
K
−γi,1
i,1 · L−δi,1i,1 ·K−γi,2i,2 · L−δi,2i,2
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and
H = g
∑u+1
i=1 ri,1+ri,2 .
5. Decryption algorithms. Algorithm pDec takes as input ciphertext ct0 = (A0, B0, C0, (Di,1, Ei,1, Di,2, Ei,2)
u+1
i=1 )
and pTok = (F,H, (Ki,1, Li,1,Ki,2, Li,2)
u+1
i=1 ) and consists in testing whether the following product
is equal to 1GT
C0 · e(A0, F ) · e(B0, H) ·
u+1∏
i=1
[
e(Di,1,Ki,1)e(Ei,1, Li,1)e(Di,2,Ki,2)e(Ei,2, Li,2)
]
.
Algorithm mDec takes as input ct0, ctk and an M-token mTok for k. By setting f := (u + 1) +
(v + 1) we can write mTok as
(F,H, (Ki,1, Li,1,Ki,2, Li,2)
f
i=1)
and, with a slight abuse of notation, we can write
ct = (A0, B0, C0, Ak, Bk, Ck, (Di,1, Ei,1, Di,2, Ei,2)
f
i=1).
The decryption algorithm returns M computed as
M = C · e(A,F ) · e(B,H) ·
f∏
i=1
[
e(Di,1,Ki,1) · e(Ei,1, Li,1) ·
e(Di,2,Ki,2) · e(Ei,2, Li,2)
]
where C = C0 · Ck, A = A0 ·Ak and B = B0 ·Bk.
4.1 Correctness of the construction
We show the correctness of the decryption algorithm for P-token in the following. We denote by bmsk0,1
and bmsk0,2 the two basic master secret keys used to compute both pTok and ct0 and we denote the
i-th element of bmsk0,1 by (γi,1, δi,1, θi,1, ωi,1) and the i-th element of bmsk0,2 by (γi,2, δi,2, θi,2, ωi,2).
We observe that, for i = 1, . . . , u+ 1, we have
e(Di,1,Ki,1) · e(Ei,1, Li,1) =
e(gl0ωi,1 ,Ki,1) · e(gq0γi,1 ,Ki,1) · e(gz1α1xi ,Ki,1)
e(gl0θi,1 , Li,1) · e(gq0δi,1 , Li,1) · e(gz1β1xi , Li,1)
and simple manipulations show that the product above is
e(g, g)ωl0ri,1 e(g, g)z1λ1xisiωe(gq0γi,1 ,Ki,1)e(g
q0δi,1 , Li,1).
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Similarly, we have
e(Di,2,Ki,2) · e(Ei,2, Li,2) = e(g, g)l0ri,2ω ·
e(g, g)z2λ2xisiω · e(gq0·γi,2 ,Ki,2) · e(gq0·δi,2 , Li,2)
and therefore
u+1∏
i=1
[
e(Di,1,Ki,1) · e(Ei,1, Li,1) · e(Di,2,Ki,2) · e(Ei,2, Li,2)
]
is equal to
e(g, g)l0ω
∑u+1
i=1 (ri,1+ri,2) · e(g, g)ω(z1λ1+z2λ2)·∑li=1 xisi ·
u+1∏
i=1
[
e(gq0·γi,1 ,Ki,1) · e(gq0·γi,2 ,Ki,2) ·
e(gq0·δi,1 , Li,1) · e(gq0·δi,2 , Li,2)
]
.
On the other hand, we have
e(A0, F ) = e(g, g2)
q0 ·
u+1∏
i=1
[
e(g−q0·γi,1 ,Ki,1) · e(g−q0·γi,2 ,Ki,2) ·
e(g−q0·δi,1 , Li,1) · e(g−q0·δi,2 , Li,2)
]
e(B0, H) = e(g, g)
−l0ω
∑u+1
i=1 (ri,1+ri,2).
Therefore if 〈X,S〉 = 0 we have that the above product is equal to e(g, g2)q0 = C−10 . On the other
hand, if 〈X,S〉 6= 0 then the above product is a random element of GT .
The decryption algorithm for an M-token is similar to the one for the P-token and can be thus omitted.
4.2 Security of the construction
In this section, we show that the AOE construction guarantees the security of the attributes and of
the plaintexts of a cumulative ciphertext.
Observe that the encryption algorithm Enc can be seen as computing a pair of basic ciphertexts:
one consisting of the Di,1,j and Ei,1,j and one consisting of the Di,2,j and Ei,2,j . The same sequence
of vectors of attributes is used for each basic ciphertext. In the hybrid games we will consider for
the security proof, this will not be necessarily the case as, in some cases, we will produce challenge
ciphertexts consisting of two basic ciphertexts computed with respect to two different sequences of
vectors of attributes. Specifically, if X 0 = (X00 , . . . , X0n) and X 1 = (X10 , . . . , X1n) are two sequences of
vectors of attributes then when we say that the sequence of messagesM = (M1, . . . ,Mn) is encrypted
with respect to (X 0,X 1), we actually mean that the first basic ciphertext is with respect to X 0 and
the second with respect to X 1.
The proof uses hybrid games parameterized by (λ, n, u, v) and by a probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm A. The hybrids differ in the way the challenge ciphertext is computed and are summarized
in the following table. There X 0 and X 1 are the two attribute sequences of length n + 1 and M0
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and M1 are the two sequences of n messages given in output by A. We let Z denote the attribute
sequence in which all attribute vectors are zeros; that is, Z = (0u, 0v, . . . , 0v).
Hybrid Plaintext Attributes
AOEGameA0 M0 (X 0,X 0)
AOEGameA1 random (X 0,X 0)
AOEGameA2 random (X 0,Z)
AOEGameA3 random (X 0,X 1)
AOEGameA4 random (Z,X 1)
AOEGameA5 random (X 1,X 1)
AOEGameA6 M1 (X 1,X 1)
We stress that the first game, AOEGameA0 , coincides with the security game AOEGame
A in which
the challenger Ch sets ξ = 0 and the last game, AOEGameA6 , coincides with the security game
AOEGameA in which the challenger Ch sets ξ = 1.
Indistinguishability of AOEGameA0 and AOEGame
A
1 is proved under the BDDH Assumption. The
proof consists in the construction of a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator B1 that interacts with
a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A and receives a sequence X of vectors of attributes, a
sequence of messages M, and a challenge (B, g, T1, T2, T3, T ) for the BDDH Assumption. Simulator
B1 simulates an interaction with A in which the challenge ciphertext, depending on the value ξ hidden
in the challenge received, is an encryption of the messages in sequence M with attributes vectors X
or an encryption of random messages with attributes vectors X . By considering B1 with X := X 0 and
M :=M0 gives that, under the BDDH Assumption, AOEGameA0 and AOEGameA1 are indistinguishable.
Instead, for indistinguishability of AOEGameA5 and AOEGame
A
6 we set X := X 1 and M :=M1.
The remaining hybrids are proved indistinguishable under the BDL Assumption. Specifically, we
construct a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator B2 that interacts with a probabilistic polynomial-
time adversary A and receives a challenge (B, g, T1, T2, T13, T4, T ) for the BDL Assumption. As addi-
tional inputs, B2 receives two sequences of attribute vectors X and V. B2, depending on the value ξ
hidden by the challenge received, simulates a game in which a randomly chosen sequence of messages
is encrypted either with respect to sequences of attributes (X ,Z) or with respect to sequences of
attributes (X ,V). Then AOEGameA1 and AOEGameA2 are proved indistinguishable by running B2 on
sequences X := X 0 and V := X 0. To prove indistinguishability of AOEGameA2 and AOEGameA3 , B2 is
run on sequences X := X 0 and V := X 1. To prove indistinguishability of AOEGameA3 and AOEGameA4 ,
and AOEGameA4 and AOEGame
A
5 , we use a mirror image of B2 (that we call B′2) that, depending on
the value ξ hidden by the challenge received, encrypts a randomly chosen sequence of messages either
with respect to sequences of attributes (Z,X ) or with respect to sequences of attributes (V,X ). Thus,
to prove indistinguishability of AOEGameA3 and AOEGame
A
4 , B′2 is run on sequences X := X 1 and
V := X 0 and to prove indistinguishability of AOEGameA4 and AOEGameA5 , B′2 is run on sequences
X := X 1 and V := X 1.
4.2.1 Simulators
Simulators B1 and B2 are described in the following. The description of B′2 can be obtained by
modifying B2 in a straightforward way and is thus omitted.
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Simulator B1. It takes as input a challenge (g, T1 = g
t1 , T2 = g
t2 , T3 = g
t3 , T = e(g, g)t1t2t3+ξ·r)
for the BDDH assumption along with a sequence M = (M1, . . . ,Mn) of messages and a sequence
X = (X0, X1, . . . , Xn) of vectors of attributes. B1 interacts with adversary A and, depending on
whether ξ = 0 or ξ = 1, simulates AOEGameA(λ, n, u, v) in which the challenge ciphertext is an
encryption with attributes X of n random elements of GT or of the messages in M.
Constructing mpk and a partial msk. The master secret key contains (n+1) pairs of basic master secret
keys (bmsk1j , bmsk
2
j ). We let `j denote the length of the basic master secret keys of the j-th pair and
write bmsk1j = (γi,1,j , δi,1,j , θi,1,j , ωi,1,j)
`j
i=1 and bmsk
2
j = (γi,2,j , δi,2,j , θi,2,j , ωi,2,j)
`j
i=1. Clearly, `0 = u+ 1
and `j = v + 1 for j > 0.
B1 starts by randomly selecting ρ0, . . . , ρn ∈ Zp and α1, α2, β1, β2, ω, y ∈ Zp. We let xi,0 denote
the i-th component of the vector (X0, y) of length u + 1; and, for j > 0, we let xi,j denote the i-th
component of the vector (y,Xj) of length v + 1.
For i = 1, . . . , `j , b = 1, 2, and j = 0, . . . , n, B2 picks random γ˜i,b,j , δ˜i,b,j , θi,b,j , ωi,b,j ∈ Zp subject to
αb · θi,b,j − βb · ωi,b,j = ω.
B1 computes the basic master secret keys in such way to implicitly set
γi,b,j = xi,j · αb · t2ρj + γ˜i,b,j
δi,b,j = xi,j · βb · t2ρj + δ˜i,b,j
It is easy to verify that the values are independent and uniformly distributed in Zp. Clearly, the
values γi,b,j and δi,b,j cannot be explicitly computed by B1 but it is easy to see that Γi,b,j = gγi,b,j and
∆i,b,j = g
δi,b,j can be computed by setting
Γi,b,j = T
xi,j ·αb· 1ρj
2 · gγ˜i,b,j
∆i,b,j = T
xi,j ·βb· 1ρj
2 · gδ˜i,b,j
and, obviously, Wi,b,j = g
ωi,b,j and Θ = gθi,b,j , for all i, b and j. Finally, B1 sets Ω = gω and, instead
of setting Λ = e(g, g2), picks a random η ∈ Zp and sets Λ = e(T1, T2)ω · e(g, g)η. The value of g2 is
thus implicitly set equal to gη+ω·t1·t2 .
Answering token queries. We next describe how B1 answers M-token queries for (S0, Sk, k). P-token
queries for vector S0 are simpler and can be handled similarly. We remind the reader that an M-
token is computed by constructing the vector (S0, 1,−1, Sk) of length f := (u + 1) + (v + 1) whose
i-th component will be denoted by si. For the sake of a more agile notation, we will collapse cor-
responding values from bmsk0 and bmskd into one single vector of length f . For example, instead
of considering vectors (ωi,1,0)
u+1
i=1 and (ωi,1,d)
v+1
i=1 as two separate vectors, we will consider the vector
of length f obtained by concatenating them and denote by ωi,1 its i-th component. Similarly, for
ωi,2, θi,1, θi,2, γ˜i,1, γ˜i,2, γi,1, γi,2, δ˜i,1, δ˜i,2, δi,1, and δi,2.
B1 sets c = 2 · (〈X0, S0〉/ρ0 + 〈Xk, Sk〉/ρk), randomly selects λ˜1, λ˜2 ∈ Zp and returns a token with
the same distribution as the token returned by mKeyGen with randomness
λ1 = λ˜1 +
t1
c
λ2 = λ˜2 +
t1
c
.
Observe that, since 〈(X0, Xk), (S0, Sk)〉 6= 0 and ρ0 and ρk are random in Zp, the probability that
c = 0 is negligible. Moreover, if c 6= 0, λ1 and λ2 are independent and uniform in Zp.
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Specifically, for i = 1, . . . , f , B1 randomly selects ri,1, ri,2 ∈ Zp and sets
Ki,b = g
−β1·ri,b+λ˜b·θi,b·si · T
θi,b·si
c
1
Li,b = g
α1·ri,b−λ˜b·ωi,b·si · T−
ωi,b·si
c
1
As the values ri,1, ri,2 are known to B1 for all i, H can be computed in a straightforward way. The
computation of F requires some more care. Given Ki,1,Ki,2 and Li,1, Li,2 and γi,1 and δi,1, F is
expected to be equal to g2 ·
∏f
i=1K
−γi,1
i,1 ·L−δi,1i,1 ·K−γi,2i,2 ·L−δi,2i,2 . By setting, µi = ρ0 for i = 1, . . . , u+ 1
and µi = ρk for i = u+ 2, . . . , f , and, for i = 1, . . . , f and b = 1, 2,
Zi,b = ωi,b · βb − θi,b · αb
Φi,b = ωi,b · δ˜i,b − θi,b · γ˜i,b
Ψi,b = βb · γ˜i,b − αb · δ˜i,b
we can we write
F = g2·
f∏
i=1
K
−γi,1
i,1 · L−δi,1i,1 ·K−γi,2i,2 · L−δi,2i,2
= g2·
[
gt1·t2
]−2·ω∑i si·xiµi·c · [gt1]∑fi=1 (Φi,1+Φi,2)·sic ·[
gt2
]∑f
i=1(λ˜1·Zi,1+λ˜2·Zi,2)·xi·si· 1µi ·
g
∑f
i=1[ri,1·Ψi,1+ri,2·Ψi,2+si·(λ˜1·Φi,1+λ˜2·Φi,2)]
Also, observe that, by definition of c, we have that
2 ·
f∑
i=1
xi · si
µi
= c
and therefore the exponent of gt1t2 in the expression above is equal to −ω. Now, by recalling that g2
has been implicitly set equal to g2 = g
η+ω·t1·t2 , F is expected to have value
F = gη · [gt1]∑fi=1 (Φi,1+Φi,2)·si·µi2·cx ·[
gt2
]∑f
i=1(λ˜1·Zi,1+λ˜2·Zi,2)·
xi·si
µi ·
g
∑f
i=1[ri,1·Ψi,1+ri,2·Ψi,2+si·(λ˜1·Φi,1+λ˜2·Φi,2)]
and B1 has all it is required to compute F according to the expression above.
Preparing the challenge ciphertexts. B1 randomly picks z˜1, z˜2 ∈ Zp and, l˜j , for j = 0, . . . , n. B1 prepares
the challenge ciphertexts as if they were generated by Enc with randomness z1 = z˜1−t2·t3, z2 = z˜2−t2·t3
and, for j = 0, . . . , n, lj = l˜j , qj = ρj ·t3. This is obtained by setting Di,b,j = g l˜j ·ωi,b,j ·T γ˜i,b,j ·ρj3 ·gαb·z˜b·xi,j
and Ei,b,j = g
l˜j ·θi,b,j · T δ˜i,b,j ·ρj3 · gβb·z˜b·xi,j . Indeed, observe that we can write Di,b,j as
Di,b,j = g
l˜j ·ωi,b,j · gρj ·t3·[γi,b,j−xi,j ·αb·
t2
ρj
] · gz˜b·xi,j ·αb
= g l˜j ·ωi,b,j · gρj ·t3·γi,b,j · g[z˜b−t2·t3]·xi,j ·αb
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and, similarly, Ei,b,j can be written as
Ei,b,j = g
l˜j ·θi,b,j · gρj ·t3·δi,b,j · g[z˜b−t2·t3]·xi,j ·βb .
Finally, for j = 0, . . . , n, B2 sets
Aj = T
ρj
3 Bj = g
l˜jω
and
Cj = T
−ω·ρj · e(g, T ρj3 )−η ·Mj .
Note that the settings above are equivalent to setting Aj = g
qj and Bj = g
lj ·ω. Let us now look at
Cj . Clearly, if ξ = 1, then T is random in GT and the challenge ciphertext constructed by B1 is the
cumulative ciphertext of sequence of random messages. Let us consider the case in which ξ = 0 and
thus T = e(g, g, )t1·t2·t3 . In this case, Cj is expected to have value
e(g, g2)
−qj ·Mj = e(g, g)−(η+ω·t1·t2)·t3·ρj ·Mj
(since g2 = g
η+ω·t1·t2)
= T−ω·ρj · e(g, T ρj3 )−η ·Mj
which is exactly the value computed by B1.
Simulator B2. It takes as input a challenge (g, T1 = gt1 , T2 = gt2 , T13 = gt1·t3 , T4 = gt4 , T =
gt2·(t3+t4)+ξ·r) for the Bilinear Decision Linear assumption and two sequences of vectors of attributes
X = (X0, X1, . . . , Xn), V = (V0, V1, . . . , Vn). We remind the reader that X0 and V0 have length u and
Xi and Vi have length v, for i = 1, . . . , n. Simulator B2 interacts with adversary A and, depending
on whether ξ = 0 or ξ = 1, simulates AOEGameA(λ, n, u, v) in which the challenge ciphertext is the
encryption of n random elements of GT with attributes (X ,Z) or (X ,V) .
B2 starts by randomly selecting ρ0, . . . , ρn ∈ Zp and α1, α2, β1, β2, ω˜, y ∈ Zp. We let xi,0 denote
the i-th component of the vector (X0, y) of length u + 1; and, for j > 0, we let xi,j denote the i-th
component of the vector (y,Xj) of length v + 1. Similarly for vi,j .
Constructing mpk and a partial msk. We next show how B2 determines the basic master secret keys.
For i = 1, . . . , `j , b = 1, 2, and j = 0, . . . , n, B2 picks random γ˜i,b,j , δ˜i,b,j , θ˜i,b,j , ω˜i,b,j ∈ Zp subject to
αb · θ˜i,b,j − βb · ω˜i,b,j = ω˜.
B2 computes the basic master secret keys in such way to implicitly set γi,1,j = γ˜i,1,j and δi,1,j = δ˜i,1,j ,
γi,2,j = α2 · vi,j · t2/ρj + γ˜i,2,j and δi,2,j = β2 · vi,j · t2/ρj + δ˜i,2,j and
θi,b,j = β1 · xi,j · t2/ρj + θ˜i,1,j · t1
ωi,b,j = α1 · xi,j · t2/ρj + ω˜i,1,j · t1
θi,2,j = β2 · vi,j · t2/ρj + θ˜i,2,j · t1
ωi,2,j = α2 · vi,j · t2/ρj + ω˜i,2,j · t1.
It is easy to verify that the exponents are independently and uniformly distributed over Zp. Clearly,
B2 can only partially compute the basic master secret keys (as they involve values from the Decision
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Linear challenge tuple). The master public key instead can be computed by the following settings.
Ω = Tω1
Γi,1,j = g
γi,1,j ∆i,1,j = g
δi,1,j
Θi,1,j = T
β1·xi
ρj
2 · T θ˜i,1,j1 Wi,1,j = T
α1·xi
ρj
2 · T ω˜i,1,j1
Γi,2,j = T
α2·vi
ρj
2 · gγ˜i,2,j ∆i,2,j = T
β2·vi
ρj
2 · gδ˜i,2,j
Θi,2,j = T
β2·vi
ρj
2 · T θ˜i,2,j1 Wi,2,j = T
α2·vi
ρj
2 · T ω˜i,2,j1 .
Simple computation shows that the settings above are compatible with the implicit settings of the
master secret key. Moreover, we note that, for j = 0, . . . , n, b = 1, 2 and i = 1, . . . , `j , we have
αbθi,b,j − βbωi,b,j = αb(βbχi,jt2/ρj + θ˜i,b,jt1)−
βb(αbχi,jt2/ρj + ω˜i,b,jt1)
= t1(αbθ˜i,b,j − βbω˜i,b,j)
= t1ω˜ := ω,
where χi,j is xi,j or vi,j , depending on whether b = 1 or b = 2.
Answering token queries. Let us now describe how B2 constructs the replies to M-token queries for
(S0, Sk, k). A P-token is constructed in a similar way. We omit further details. We use the same
notation as for simulator B1.
B2 starts by computing cx, cw ∈ Zp \ {0} such that
cw · 〈(S0, Sk), (X0, Xk)〉 = cx · 〈(S0, Sk), (W0,Wk)〉. (2)
Notice that if one of the two inner product is 0, so is the other and thus it is always possible to
choose cx and cw. If both inner products are equal to 0, B2 takes cx = cw = 1. B2 then picks random
λ˜1, λ˜2 ∈ Zp and, for each i, random values r˜i,1, r˜i,2 ∈ Zp and constructs the values Ki,1, Li,1,Ki,2, Li,2
as if they were computed by BKeyGen with randomness λ1 = λ˜1 − λ˜2t1 , λ2 = λ˜2t1 and, for i = 1, . . . , f ,
ri,1 = r˜i,1 − cw · λ˜2·xi·si·τit1
ri,2 = r˜i,2 · t1 + cx · λ˜2·vi·si·τit1
where xi, vi and si respectively denote the i-th component of vectors (X0, y, y,Xj), (W0, y, y,Wj),
and (S0, 1,−1, Sj) and τi = t2/ρ0 for i = 1, . . . , u + 1 and τi = t2/ρj for i = u + 2, . . . , f . Simple
computation shows that Ki,1, Li,1,Ki,2, Li,2 can be computed in the following way
Ki,1 = T
λ˜1·si·θ˜i,1
1 · T λ˜1·si·xi·β12,i · g−β1·r˜i,1 · g−λ˜2·si·θ˜i,1
Li,1 = T
−λ˜1·si·ω˜i,1
1 · T−λ˜1·si·xi·α12,i · gα1·r˜i,1 · gλ˜2·si·ω˜i,1
Ki,2 = T
−β2·r˜i,2
1 · gλ˜2·si·θ˜i,2
Li,2 = T
α2·r˜i,2
1 · g−cx·λ˜2·si·ω˜i,2
where, for i = 1, . . . , u+ 1 and for b = 1, 2, we set
T2,i = T
1/ρ0
2 θ˜i,b = θi,b,0 ω˜i,b = θi,b,0
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for i = u+ 2, . . . , f and for b = 1, 2, we set
T2,i = T
1/ρj
2 θ˜i,b = θi−(u+1),b,j ω˜i,b = θi−(u+1),b,j .
Let us now show how B2 computes the two remaining values F and H. As far as H is concerned,
we observe that each i contributes the factor g−(r˜i,1+r˜i,2) and that
r˜i,1 + r˜i,2 = ri,1 + t1ri,2 +
λ˜2 · t2
t1
· (cxsivi − cwsixi)
= ri,1 + t1ri,2
where we have used Equation 2. Therefore H can be computed by multiplying, for all i, the factors
gri,1 ·T ri,21 . Let us now concentrate on F . Each i contributes to F the factor K−γi,1i,1 ·L−δi,1i,1 ·K−γi,2i,2 ·L−δi,2i,2
and note that γi,1 and δi,1 are known to B2. We next show that B2 can compute the remaining
component. Indeed, B2 needs to compute
K
−γi,2
i,2 · L−δi,2i,2 =
[
T
−β2·r˜i,2
1 · gλ˜
2·si·θ˜i,2
]α2·χi·τ2+γ˜i,2
·
[
T
α2·r˜i,2
1 · g−λ˜
2·si·ω˜i,2
]β2·χi·τ2+δ˜i,2
but notice that the unknown, to B2, term T τ21 cancels out leaving only terms that can be computed
using quantities available to B2. This completes the description of how B2 answers token queries.
Preparing the challenge ciphertexts. We remind the reader that, for j = 0, . . . , n, the challenge
ciphertext consists of Aj , Bj , Cj and a pair (ct1,j , ct2,j) of basic ciphertexts each consisting of `j pairs
of elements. More precisely, we write ct1,j = (Di,1,j , Ei,1,j)
`j
i=1 and ct2,j = (Di,2,j , Ei,2,j)
`j
i=2. Let us
now describe how the pair of basic ciphertexts is computed. B2 randomly picks z˜1, µ0, . . . , µn ∈ Zp
and computes the j-th pair of basic ciphertexts as if output by the Enc algorithm with randomness
lj = t3 · ρj and qj = t4 · ρj + µj and
z˜1 = z˜
1 − t2 · t3 z2 = r.
Notice that z1 and z2 and lj ’s and qj ’s are independently and uniformly distributed in Zp.
For each j, B2 sets Aj = T ρj4 · gµj = gt4·ρj+µj = gqj , Bj = T ρj ·ω13 = gω˜·t3·ρj = glj ·ω˜ and randomly
selects Cj at random in GT . The components, Di,1,j and Ei,1,j , of the first basic ciphertext are
computed as
Di,1,j = T
ρjωi,1,j
13 T
ρjγi,1,j
4 g
α1xi,j z˜1gµjγi,1,j
= gt3ρj(ωi,1,j t1+t2α1xi,j/ρj)g(t4ρj+µj)γ˜i,1,j ·
·gα1xi,j(z˜1−t2t3)
= gljωi,1,jgqjγi,1,jgz1α1xi,j
Ei,1,j = T
ρj θ˜i,1,j
13 · T ρj ·δ˜i,1,j4 · gβ1·xi,j ·z˜1 · gµj ·δ˜i,1,j
Simple algebraic manipulations, similar to the ones used for Di,1,j , show that Ei,1,j = g
lj ·θi,1,j ·gqj ·δi,1,j ·
gz1·β1·xi,j . Therefore Di,1,j and Ei,1,j are distributed exactly claimed. The components, Ei,2,j and Di,2,j ,
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of the second basic ciphertext are computed as
Di,2,j = T
ρj ω˜i,2,j
13 T
ρj γ˜i,2,j
4 T
α2vi,jgµj γ˜i,2,jgµjα2vi,jt2/ρj
= gt3ρj ω˜i,2,jt1gt4ρj γ˜i,2,jgα2vi,j [t2(t3+t4)+r]
·gµj γ˜i,2,jgµjα2vi,jt2/ρj
= gt3ρj(ω˜i,2,jt1+α2vi,jt2/ρj)gγ˜i,2,j(t4ρj+µj)
·gα2vi,jt2/ρjt4ρjgα2vi,jt2/ρjµjgrα2vi,j
= gt3ρj(ωi,2t1+α
2χit2/ρj) ·
·g(t4ρj+µj)(γi,2+α2χit2/ρj)grα2vi,j
= gljωi,2,jgqjγi,2,jgrα2vi,j
Ei,2,j = T
ρj θ˜i,2,j
13 T
ρj δ˜i,2,j
4 g
µjβ2vi,jt2/ρj+µj δ˜i,2,jT β
2vi,j
Simple algebraic manipulations give
Ei,2,j = g
lj ·θi,2,j · gqj ·δi,2,j · gr·β2·vi,j .
Finally, observe that if r = 0 the ciphertext produced corresponds to n random messages encrypted
with attributes (X ,Z). If instead r is random, then B2 has produced the cumulative ciphertext
corresponding to n random messages encrypted with attributes (X ,V).
5 Experimental evaluation
Our experimental work consists of a complete implementation in C/C++ of our AOE and of an
implementation of our scenario (see Figure 1). We use the MIRACL library2, freely provided by
CertiVox (now MIRACL). Our implementation uses a Barreto-Naehrig curve over a 256-bit field [5]
that gives a security level equivalent to AES-128. The source code is available at https://github.
com/secureselect/SecSel.
We remind the reader that our data is organized as a stream of rows with the same number of cells
and that each row is encrypted independently from the other rows, possibly by different DSs. For a
stream composed of rows with m columns, we instantiate an AOE that can encrypt n := m plaintexts
(one for each cell of the row to be encrypted) with l := 2m+ 1 common attributes and k := 2 specific
attributes. Let us see how l and k are determined by describing the encryption procedure (Step ii
of the scenario). Consider a row consisting of m strings c1, . . . , cm (the cells). For i = 1, . . . ,m,
the encryption procedure randomly selects an element gi of the target group GT and then obtains a
128-bit key ki by hashing the selected element (this is done by using the hash to aes key function
of the MIRACL library). Finally, ci is encrypted with AES in CBC mode using ki as a key. The m
group elements g1, . . . , gm are then encrypted with our AOE (remember that the message space of our
AOE implementation coincides with the target group GT ). The attributes used to encrypt the gi’s are
derived from the strings c1, . . . , cm and from the noise R. Remember that the attribute space of our
AOE coincides with Zp (p is the prime order of the bilinear setting used) and thus we first hash each ci
to obtain xi ∈ Zp. The common attributes used to encrypt the cells are obtained from the m integers
x1, . . . , xm and from R and they correspond to the values of the monomials that could possibly have a
non-zero coefficient in the polynomial resulting from the arithmetization of the predicate corresponding
2https://github.com/miracl/MIRACL
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to the queries supported by our system (the arithmetization is, for example, illustrated in [24]). It is
straightforward to see that, for every supported query Q, the polynomial corresponding to predicate
PPQ has at most 2 ·m+ 1 non-zero terms (i.e., x1, . . . , xm, R and R ·x1, . . . , R ·xm). For example, the
query Q from the previous example that asks for the userId of all patients with fever and nausea with
R′ = 2 corresponds to polynomial (R−2)·[r5 ·(x5−1)+r6 ·(x6−1)] obtained by arithmetizing predicate
PPQ, for randomly chosen r5, r6. This is expanded into a vector of 13 = 2m+1 entries with 6 non-zero
entries (corresponding to coefficients of R, x5, x6, of R · x5, of R · x6 and the zero-degree term). The
polynomial corresponding to predicate PMQ contributes two more terms (the one corresponding to the
clause (i = d)). Therefore, we have l = 2m+ 1 and k = 2 for a total of 2m+ 1 + 2m = 4m+ 1 = Θ(m)
attributes. Firstly, we provide experimental evidence that AOE has better performance than (non-
amortized) Orthogonality encryption and this justifies the introduction of AOE as a new primitive.
We report below the multiplicative blow-up in time for the encryption function of Orthogonality with
respect to AOE and in space of the Orthogonality ciphertext with respect to the AOE ciphertext.
#cols time memory
16 1.56 2.38
32 2.96 4.5
64 6.09 8.98
128 12.11 17.79
Thus, for rows with 32 cells AOE is faster by almost a factor of 3 and uses 4.5 times less memory.
The gap between the two implementations widens as the number of cells in a row grows. This is
expected since, as remarked in the “Efficiency” paragraph of Section I.B, AOE yields row encryption
with linear (in the number of cells) time and space complexity whereas (non-amortized) Orthogonality
encryption gives quadratic complexity. We remark that the time needed to encrypt a row does not
depend on how similar the cells of the row are.
The aim of the next experiment is to collect data on the time needed by each operation and times
must not be considered in absolute terms but only to have an idea of the time needed to process a
cell. This is particularly true for encryption as it will be performed by DSs that will likely batch
encrypt only a few rows every time. Significant is the running time of the P-token application and
this is a direct consequence of the fact that the distributed nature of our scenario does not allow for
the option of pre-processing the data before uploading it to the cloud repository. We remark also
that it is reasonable to assume that the QP (the party applying the P-token) is the one with the most
computing power. Moreover, the fact that the P-token can be applied to each row independently
makes it amenable of a highly parallel implementation. The next table reports an estimate of the time
per cell in milliseconds for each of the four operations. The time for token generation is the time to
generate both tokens.
Operation ms per cell/column
Key Generation 1
Encryption 3.7
Token Generation 51
Applying a P-token 1.82
Applying an M-token 2.5
6 Conclusions
In this work we have introduce the notion of a Secure Stream Selection scheme SSS. Here a number of
potentially untrusted parties can encrypt elements in a stream data that can be selectively decrypted
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by third parties authorized by a trusted data owner. We give two notions of security, a game-based
one and a simulation-based one, that are shown to be equivalent for a class of access policies that
include policies of interest for applications.
We give a construction of SSS on top of Amortized Orthogonality Encryption scheme AOE that
permits the efficient encryption of several data items with respect to sets of attributes that differ
in few elements. We have proved that our construction is secure under standard assumptions in a
bilinear setting. We have provided an implementation that shows the feasibility and effectiveness of
our approach, using the C/C++ MIRACL library.
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